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Abstract: We explore the influences on the saving behaviour of children aged 11 to 
15 using panel data drawn from the British Household Panel Survey Youth 
Questionnaire. Our empirical findings suggest that parental allowances/pocket money 
exert a moderating influence on the probability that a child will save, whilst hours of 
paid work undertaken by the child are positively associated with the probability that a 
child will save. The saving behaviour of parents, however, does not appear to 
influence the saving behaviour of their offspring. In contrast, financial optimism on 
the part of parents does appear to lower the probability that their children will save. In 
addition, our empirical analysis reveals some interesting differences relating to the 
determinants of the saving behaviour of boys and girls as well as evidence of state 
dependence in the saving behaviour of children.  
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1. Introduction and background 
Over the past three decades, the empirical literature exploring household finances has 
been growing steadily (see Guiso et al., 2002, for a comprehensive review of this 
area). In general, in the existing literature, economists have focused on specific 
aspects of the household financial portfolio such as debt (for example, Brown and 
Taylor, 2008), the demand for risky financial assets (for example, Hochguertel et al., 
1997) and savings (for example, Browning and Lusardi, 1996). One area, which has 
attracted limited interest in the economics literature, concerns the intergenerational 
link between the attitudes towards finances of parents and their children. In contrast, 
there has been considerable recent interest in the relationship between the educational 
attainment of parents and their children (see Black and Devereux, 2011, for a recent 
survey). Extensive empirical evidence has supported the existence of a strong positive 
intergenerational association in educational attainment.1 
The aim of this paper is to explore whether an intergenerational link exists 
between the saving behaviour of parents and their children as well as to explore the 
influences on the saving behaviour of children more generally. One might conjecture 
that an intergenerational link may exist between the attitudes towards finances 
between parents and their children as parents may seek to equip their children with 
particular values and life skills. A relatively extensive literature exists exploring the 
implications and importance of financial literacy for a range of financial decisions 
such as preparation for retirement, saving behaviour, stock market participation and 
financial portfolio diversification, with the focus generally being on U.S. households 
(see, for example, Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007), yet there has been limited discussion 
of the intergenerational relationship between such skills and attitudes. Such an 
                                                 
1
 See Brown et al. (2011) for discussion of possible explanations for this positive intergenerational 
relationship. 
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association may reflect an intergenerational link between both cognitive skills in 
terms of financial literacy as well as non cognitive skills in terms of personality traits 
such as attitudes towards finances and taking risk.2 As argued by Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2007), p. 213, ‘savings decisions are complex, requiring consumers to possess 
substantial economic knowledge and information.’ It may be the case, therefore, that 
parents who possess a certain degree of financial literacy may seek to impart such 
skills to their offspring in order to equip them with financial management skills for 
the future.  
There has been recent interest amongst policy-makers in promoting financial 
literacy amongst children and adults to enhance financial outcomes. For example, 
‘Economic-Well-being and Financial Capability’ forms part of the UK National 
Curriculum for schools, albeit a non-statutory component, with the aim of teaching 
school pupils to manage their money and finances effectively. Guidance on how to 
incorporate personal finance education into the curriculum is provided nationally by 
the Department for Education.3 In the context of the need for ‘the adults of the future’ 
to take responsibility for their finances, the Financial Services Authority (2006) 
conducted a survey of 1,156 UK primary and secondary schools to explore the 
provision of personal financial education in schools in the UK.4 The findings indicate 
that, although a high level of importance is attached to such education in schools, it 
attracts a relatively low profile within the school curriculum. Out of the 582 
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 Brunello and Schlotter (2011) present a comprehensive review of the growing empirical literature in 
economics exploring the role of non cognitive skills for school and labour market outcomes, and argue 
that there is evidence that high cognitive test scores reflect both high cognitive skills and non cognitive 
skills such as motivation and personality traits. In a recent contribution, Anger (2011) explores the 
transmission of cognitive and non cognitive skills from parents to their offspring using the German 
Socio-Economic Panel. The findings suggest that the intergenerational association is not as strong for 
non-cognitive skills as compared to cognitive skills. 
3
 See https://www.education.gov.uk. 
4
 The Financial Services Authority, which was set-up by the UK Government, regulates the financial 
services industry in the UK. 
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secondary schools teaching personal finance, 55% covered the topic of savings and 
investments.  
Although there has been limited interest in the economics literature in this 
area, some interest in this intergenerational relationship exists in sociology and related 
disciplines, with the focus on ‘parental financial socialisation’ of college students. For 
a concise survey of this area and a recent contribution to this literature, see Grinstein-
Weiss et al. (2011), who explore a sample of low and moderate income households 
and find that adults who received relatively high levels of money-management 
education from their parents during their childhood had lower credit card debt and 
higher credit scores as adults.  
It is apparent, therefore, that both parents and the teaching of personal finance 
in schools may serve to influence the current money management of children as well 
as their future money management during adulthood. Hence, we aim to contribute to 
the existing literature by exploring the relationship between attitudes towards finance 
in the form of savings between parents and their offspring in order to shed some light 
on the potential intergenerational aspect of the determinants of attitudes towards 
finances, which has not been the focus of existing research in economics. In 
particular, we focus on analysing potential parental influences on the financial 
decisions made by their offspring during childhood by exploring the impact of 
parental saving on their offspring’s saving behaviour as a child, as well as exploring 
the influences on the saving behaviour of children more generally. 
The finances of children are arguably driven by two main sources: pocket 
money or allowances financed by parents; and earnings from part-time work such as 
paper rounds and baby-sitting. There are a small number of studies in the economic 
psychology literature exploring the provision of pocket money to children. For 
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example, Furnham (2001) explores parental attitudes towards pocket money amongst 
a sample of 300 British parents. Approximately three-quarters of the sample believed 
that children should be encouraged to save pocket money or financial gifts with only a 
third of the sample being of the opinion that a fixed amount should be saved. The 
majority of parents believed that saving should commence with the start of pocket 
money. Furthermore, three-quarters of parents expressed the opinion that children as 
young as age 10 should explore savings accounts in order to choose the most 
appropriate one. Such findings support the notion that the provision of pocket money 
represents a kind of ‘economic education’ within the household, an area of research 
which has attracted attention in the psychology literature (see, Barnet-Verzat and 
Wolff, 2002, for a concise survey of this area). Barnet-Verzat and Wolff (2002) 
explore the motives behind intergenerational financial transfers focusing on pocket 
money and discuss three main motives in the economics literature for transfers from 
parents to children: ‘altruism, exchange and preference shaping.’5 Their econometric 
study of 5,300 families in France indicates heterogeneity in parental motives to give 
pocket money and no support for the assumption that a single motive is universally 
true.  
In terms of children’s earned income, there appears to be less interest in the 
economics literature in the part-time work of children in the context of developed 
countries in contrast to the literature on developing countries.6 The standard labour 
supply framework predicts an inverse relationship between children’s hours of paid 
labour supply and parental allowances/pocket money, with parental 
                                                 
5
 Altruistic motives refer to the ‘warm glow’ parents may enjoy from giving their children money 
whereas exchange motives refer to the services children may provide to parents such as carrying out 
household chores and preference shaping relates to the provision of economic education. 
6
 Gong (2009) concludes from a review of findings from the existing literature on developed countries 
that ‘the primary motivation for youths to work is to finance short-term personal consumption rather 
than support family expenses or save for college.’ P. 654. 
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allowances/pocket money serving to act essentially as unearned income for children. 
In general, this inverse relationship has been confirmed by the findings reported in the 
relatively small empirical literature in this area. For example, Dustmann et al. (2009) 
analyse the labour supply of British 16 year olds as well as the financial transfers that 
they received from their parents. The findings indicate interdependency between the 
labour supply of 16 year olds and parental financial transfers. Similarly, Gong (2009), 
analysing a sample of 12 to 16 year olds drawn from the US National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth, finds that parental pocket money reduces the incentives of youths to 
work. In our empirical analysis of the saving behaviour of children, we explicitly 
allow for the effects of allowances or pocket money and income from work received 
by children. 
2. Data and Methodology 
Our focus on the intergenerational relationship between the saving behaviour of 
parents and their offspring clearly requires information on the saving behaviour of 
both parents and their children. For this purpose, we use the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS), a survey conducted by the Institute for Social and Economic 
Research comprising approximately 10,000 annual individual interviews, which meets 
our data requirements. For wave one, interviews were conducted during the autumn of 
1991. The same individuals are re-interviewed in successive waves – the latest 
available being 2008. Since 1994, children aged 11 to 15 completed a short interview 
for the BHPS Youth Questionnaire. Thus, we are able to match the responses to the 
BHPS Youth Questionnaire with that of the adult questionnaires in order to link 
information relating to children and their parents. 
 Specifically, in the BHPS Youth Questionnaire for years 1997 to 2001 and 
2005, the children were asked ‘what do you usually do with your money?’ The 
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possible responses were: save to buy things; save and not spend; and spend 
immediately. The responses thus provide information relating to the saving behaviour 
of children and enable us to analyse the saving behaviour of a sample of dependent 
children as opposed to young adults. We pool these waves of the BHPS Youth 
Questionnaire in order to form an unbalanced panel of data with 6,201 observations. 
The responses to this question by the age of the respondents are detailed below. 
Saving Behaviour of Children Aged 11 to 15 
 Age 11 Age 12 Age 13 Age 14 Age 15 All ages 
Save to buy things 41% 41% 45% 44% 45% 43% 
Save and not spend 40% 39% 36% 34% 29% 35% 
Spend immediately 19% 20% 19% 22% 26% 22% 
OBSERVATIONS 1,157 1,295 1,251 1,259 1,239 6,201 
It is apparent that the proportion of children responding in each category is relatively 
stable across the age range. The responses indicate that a significant proportion of 
children spend their money immediately and, hence, do not save.  
For these years, children aged 11 to 15 are also asked about the amount of 
money that they received in the form of pocket money or allowances. Specifically 
children are asked: ‘How much money did you receive last week to spend on yourself? 
Please include pocket money and any allowance you get. But if you have a job, do not 
include money you earned.’ Additional information is also available relating to hours 
worked for pay and the money they have received from that work. Specifically, 
children were asked: ‘Last week, how many hours did you spend doing work for 
pay?’7 They were also asked: ‘How much money did you earn last week? Do not 
                                                 
7
 In the UK, there are legal restrictions imposed on child employment (for further details see 
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Parents/ParentsRights/DG_4002945). In particular, during school term 
time children may work a maximum of 12 hours per week, whereas during school holidays, 13 to 14 
(15 to 16) year olds may work a maximum of 25 (35) hours per week. The interviews for the BHPS 
took place in January, February, March, April, May, September, October, November and December. 
Since the interviews did not take place in the main school holiday period (July and August), we treat 12 
hours per week as the upper limit on hours worked. We, therefore, omit 2% of the sample of children 
who report weekly hours of work in excess of 12 hours. 
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include pocket money or allowances.’8 It is apparent that the responses to this 
question could potentially cover earnings from both formal and informal employment. 
Indeed, children in the UK are legally allowed to work from the age of 13, with 
certain exceptions that allow working at a younger age, such as work in television, the 
theatre or modelling, which requires a performance licence. Hence, reported hours of 
work below the age of 13 could relate to this specific type of work or could reflect 
informal work, possibly carried out at home. The responses to the questions on 
allowances and part-time work by the age of the respondents are summarised below.  
Income Sources of Children Aged 11 to 15 
Sample = All Children 
Average Age 11 Age 12 Age 13 Age 14 Age 15 All ages 
Allowance (£) 6.51 8.07 9.03 11.35 12.81 9.59 
Weekly Earnings (£) 1.28 1.70 3.19 4.51 7.40 3.63 
Hours Worked 0.39 0.51 0.89 1.41 2.08 1.05 
% Positive Hours 14% 17% 26% 32% 39% 26% 
OBSERVATIONS 1,157 1,295 1,251 1,259 1,239 6,201 
Sample = Children Reporting Positive Hours of Work 
Average Age 11 Age 12 Age 13 Age 14 Age 15 All ages 
Allowance (£) 8.70 8.17 8.56 9.91 10.75 9.53 
Weekly Earnings (£) 5.24 7.87 10.92 13.45 18.20 12.72 
Hours Worked 2.58 2.95 3.44 4.44 5.30 4.10 
OBSERVATIONS 161 224 323 399 486 1,593 
In accordance with expectations, the amount of allowances, the number of hours 
worked and weekly earnings all increase with age. This is also the case with the 
number of children reporting positive hours of work, with 39% of 15 year olds 
reporting positive hours of paid work as compared to only 14% of 11 year olds. 
 Parents, on the other hand, were asked: ‘Do you save any amount of your 
income for example by putting something away now and then in a bank, building 
society, or Post Office account other than to meet regular bills? About how much on 
average do you manage to save a month?’ The responses to this question provide 
relatively detailed information pertaining to the regular saving behaviour of parents. 
                                                 
8
 All monetary variables in the subsequent analysis are deflated using 2001 prices. 
9 
 
We are thus able to match the saving behaviour of parents with that of their offspring: 
36% of the matched sample indicate that both parents and offspring save whilst 13% 
indicate that neither parents nor their offspring save. In addition, parents were asked 
to indicate whether they were saving for ‘no specific reason.’ The responses to this 
question reveal information relating to whether or not individuals are in the habit of 
regular saving without a specific purpose. As well as providing information on 
parental saving, the BHPS includes information on the financial expectations of adults 
in the household. To be specific, adult members of the household were asked: 
‘Looking ahead, how do you think you yourself will be financially a year from now, 
will you be: better than now; worse than now; or about the same.’ Hence, we are also 
able to explore whether parental financial expectations influence the saving behaviour 
of their offspring. 
 We focus on exploring the determinants of the probability that children spend 
their money immediately, i.e. they do not save, via a random effects binary probit 
framework as follows: 
( )*1 log ' ' 0
0
it it it it it it it
it
S if S A Hr
S otherwise
γ θ ε= = + + >
=
+ + F Xφ ϕ
  
  (1) 
where there are i=1,…N children, and t=1,…T time periods, *itS  is a latent dependent 
variable, ( )log itA  is the allowance received by the child in the previous week,9 itHr  
denotes the number of hours worked by the child in the previous week, itF  is a vector 
of parental financial controls (described in detail below) and itX  is a vector of 
additional child and household characteristics (see below). The error term in equation 
(1) can be written as a function of two components, an individual specific element 
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 Approximately 14% of children do not have a weekly allowance. In order to convert to natural 
logarithms, we add one to the level of the weekly allowance. 
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that does not vary with time and a remaining component, which is assumed to be 
uncorrelated over time, it i itε α ν= + . The individual specific unobservable effect is 
denoted by iα  and itν  is a random error term. We adopt a random effects 
specification, where itν ∼ ( )20, iIN σ . To marginalise the likelihood, it is assumed that, 
conditional on the covariates in equation (1), the iα  are ( )20,IN ασ  and independent 
of itε  and the covariates. Since the individual specific time invariant random effect, 
iα , captures unobserved individual heterogeneity, the random effects probit 
specification controls for unobserved heterogeneity. The correlation between the 
individual specific element of the error term is a constant given by 
( ) ( )2 2 2,ik ilcorr k lα α νρ ε ε σ σ σ= = + ≠ , which represents the proportion of the total 
variance contributed by the panel variance component. For a full discussion of the 
random effects probit model see Arulampalam (1999). In order to explore whether the 
influences on the saving behaviour of boys and girls differ, we repeat the analysis 
splitting by the gender of the child, where around 50% of the sample of 6,201 children 
are boys. 
The child may be less likely to save if he/she has exhibited such behaviour in 
the past. Hence, in order to explore the robustness of our findings, we also explore 
whether state dependence is exhibited in the child’s saving behaviour by analysing the 
dynamics of their saving behaviour over the time period. The child’s likelihood of 
spending money immediately, i.e. not saving, over the period is modelled as follows, 
based upon a random effects dynamic panel estimator (see Stewart, 2006):  
( )* 11 log ' ' 0
0
it it it it it it it i it
it
S if S S A Hr
S otherwise
pi γ θ υ ω
−
= = + + + + >
=
+ + F Xφ ϕ
  (2) 
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Although it is assumed that itω  is white noise, the composite error term, it i itψ υ ω= + , 
is likely to be correlated over time due to the individual specific time invariant iυ  
term. The individual specific random effects specification adopted implies equi-
correlation between the itψ  in any two different time periods given by the following 
constant: ( ) ( )2 2 2,ik ilcorr k lυ υ ωλ ψ ψ σ σ σ= = + ≠ . The covariates are defined as in 
equation (1), which are discussed in detail below, and 1itS −  is a binary indicator of the 
child’s past saving behaviour, that is whether the child did not save in the previous 
year. The analysis is conducted over 5,103 observations covering the period 1997-
2001.10 We also consider the saving behaviour of boys and girls separately within this 
dynamic framework, with sample sizes of 2,580 and 2,523 respectively. 
State dependence in terms of the statistical significance of 1itS −  and the size of 
pi , as well as the importance of heterogeneity, as indicated by λ , can be investigated 
by estimating equation (2). In order to deal with the initial conditions, following 
Stewart (2006, 2007), we include a static reduced form equation for the first period 
using the same covariates as in equation (2), but excluding the lagged dependent 
variable. Also included in the static reduced form equation are binary controls for the 
occupation that the head of household, i.e. the child’s parent, was first employed in 
(where an unskilled occupation or never employed form the reference category), 
which act as identifying variables. These additional controls are jointly significant in 
the static reduced form equation. 
In estimating the random effects probit and the dynamic probit models, we 
explore three specifications, which differ in terms of the parent’s financial variables, 
itF . The first specification includes the natural logarithm of the total amount of 
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 We have excluded the year 2005 from the analysis given the three year gap in the panel. 
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savings of both parents as well as a binary indicator for whether both parents save for 
‘no specific reason’ and a binary indicator for whether both parents are financially 
optimistic (i.e. they both think that they will be better off financially in a year’s time) 
and a binary indicator for whether they believe that they will be ‘about the same’ 
financially in a year’s time. In the second specification, the natural logarithm of the 
total amount of the father’s savings is included as well as a binary control for whether 
the father saves for no reason and controls for the financial expectations of the father. 
In the third specification, we control for the mother’s saving behaviour and the 
mother’s financial expectations. The second and the third specifications allow us to 
explore whether fathers and mothers exert different influences on the saving 
behaviour of their children.11 
In the set of explanatory variables in vector itX , we control for child 
characteristics including: gender; a quadratic in age; whether the child lives with 
his/her birth parents; a binary indicator for whether the child has a computer at home; 
in terms of educational aspirations, we control for whether the individual intends to go 
to college or sixth form after the compulsory schooling age of 16. Additionally, we 
control for household characteristics, in particular: household labour income; 
household non labour income; housing tenure to proxy household wealth, i.e. owning 
the home without a mortgage, owning the home with a mortgage and renting from the 
council; the number of adults in the household; the number of children in the 
household; a binary indicator for a single parent household; year controls; and region 
controls. Summary statistics of the above variables are presented in Table 1. The 
average age of the children in the sample is 13, 33% (38%) of fathers (mothers) are 
financially optimistic, in terms of educational aspirations 67% (77%) of boys (girls) 
                                                 
11
 For all monetary covariates, in order to convert to natural logarithms, we add one to the level of the 
variable in question. 
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intend to continue in education after reaching the compulsory school leaving age, and 
around 21% of children live in a single parent household.  
3. Results 
Random Effects Probit Framework 
In Table 2 Panel A, we present the findings from the random effects probit analysis 
for the three specifications described in detail above. Clearly, across the three 
specifications, over time the unobserved individual child heterogeneity of the panel is 
of importance both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance in explaining the 
residual variance, as can be seen by the estimated ρ parameter. The results indicate 
that the child’s allowance is positively associated with the probability that the child 
spends his/her money immediately, i.e. does not save, across all three specifications. 
The magnitude of the effect of a 1 per cent increase in the child’s allowance is also 
stable across the three specifications increasing the probability that the child does not 
save by 2.1 percentage points. In contrast, the number of hours that the child works 
per week is inversely associated with the probability of not saving, thus, indicating a 
distinct difference in the influence of these two different sources of children’s income 
on their saving behaviour.  
Across the three specifications, the total amount of savings of the parents, the 
father’s savings and the mother’s savings all have statistically insignificant effects on 
the saving behaviour of their children. Hence, it would appear that the actual saving 
behaviour of parents does not influence the saving behaviour of their offspring, which 
may reflect the possibility that parents do not share information regarding such 
household financial matters with their children. In contrast, with respect to the 
parent’s financial expectations, optimistic or stable financial outlooks as compared to 
pessimistic financial expectations are positively associated with the probability of the 
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child not saving, with a magnitude of approximately 2 to 3 percentage points. This 
corresponds to around a 14% increase in the unconditional probability that the child 
does not save. Hence, the financial outlook of the child’s parents does appear to 
matter as compared to the actual saving behaviour of parents, with the financial 
expectations of the father being particularly important in terms of the magnitude of 
the influence.  
 Turning briefly to comment on the additional control variables, the age of the 
child and whether the child resides with his/her birth parents are both inversely 
associated with the probability of not saving. Interestingly, the age effects dominate 
the marginal effects in terms of magnitude across the three specifications, yet no clear 
pattern was evident in the raw data discussed in Section 2 above. In addition, whether 
the child indicates that he/she intends to go to college or sixth form after completing 
compulsory education has a relatively large inverse effect on the probability of not 
saving. In contrast, not having a computer in the household and being in a single 
parent household are both positively associated with the probability of the child not 
saving, which accords with intuition in that single parent households are more likely 
to be financially constrained and, hence, income received by the child may be 
required for immediate consumption purposes. There is no influence from the level of 
household labour and non labour income on the probability of the child not saving, 
rather it would appear that wealth effects are more important as proxied by housing 
tenure. Specifically, whether the home is owned outright decreases the likelihood that 
the child does not save by approximately 5 percentage points across the three 
specifications. To summarise, the magnitudes of the effects stemming from the child’s 
allowance and the financial attitudes of the parents are around a third of the size of the 
15 
 
marginal effect associated with whether the child intends to go to college or sixth 
form and are comparable with the influence of the child’s gender.12 
 It is apparent from the small existing empirical literature on children’s income 
in the context of developed countries that the amount of the parental allowance 
received by the child and the number of hours worked by the child may be 
interdependent (see Gong, 2009). Hence, in order to explore the robustness of the 
findings presented in Table 2 Panel A, although we do control for both the parental 
allowance and the child’s hours of work in the previous analysis, we endogenise the 
child’s allowance and the number of hours worked by estimating a bivariate tobit 
model following the approach of Gong (2009).13 Specifically, the child’s allowance is 
modelled conditional upon their hours of work, child and household characteristics. 
The identifying covariates, which follow the existing literature, are total family 
income and the education and employment status of the mother and the father. The 
number of hours worked is modelled conditional upon the child’s allowance, child 
and household characteristics, where, again following the existing literature, the 
identifying covariates are the hourly pay received by the child for paid work and the 
education and employment status of the mother and the father.14 We use the results 
from estimating this simultaneous equations model to predict the allowance and the 
number of hours worked per week and we then re-estimate equation (1) replacing the 
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 In order to further explore the robustness of our empirical findings, we have also utilised a 
multinomial logit framework with clustered standard errors to control for the repeated child 
observations distinguishing between three categories of saving behaviour: spend immediately; save to 
buy things; and save and not spend. We specify spend immediately as the base category. Our findings 
are in line with those reported in Table 2 with the child’s allowance being inversely associated with 
both saving categories and hours of work being positively associated with both saving categories. 
13
 The tobit framework allows for the truncation of the dependent variable at zero since work hours by 
definition cannot take negative values. 
14
 The results from estimating the simultaneous model, which are available upon request, are consistent 
with the existing literature in that there is an inverse relationship between the child’s weekly allowance 
and hours worked. 
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exogenous values of the allowance and hours worked with the values predicted from 
the bivariate framework.15  
In Table 2 Panel B, we summarise the findings from repeating the analysis in 
Table 2 Panel A replacing the parental allowance and hours of work with their 
predicted values obtained as described above. In terms of signs and statistical 
significance, it can be seen that the results relating to the parental allowance and hours 
of work are robust to this approach, with the magnitude of the marginal effect of the 
parental allowance being heightened and that of hours worked being reduced. Thus, 
our findings of a positive influence of parental allowances and a negative influence of 
children’s work hours on the probability of children not saving would appear to be 
relatively robust. 
To investigate whether differences exist between the influences on the saving 
behaviour of boys and girls, we repeat the analysis above splitting by the gender of 
the child. In addition, this also allows us to explore the relationship between the 
saving behaviour of mothers and daughters and the relationship between the saving 
behaviour of fathers and sons. The results are summarised in Table 3A, where both 
the child’s allowance and hours worked are exogenous variables and in Table 3B, 
where these variables are treated as endogenous. There are two panels in Tables 3A 
and 3B: Panel A presents the results for boys and Panel B presents the results for 
girls. For brevity, both tables only show the parameters associated with the key 
covariates of interest. As found for the sample as a whole, the estimated ρ parameters 
indicate that unobserved child heterogeneity in the panel is of importance for both 
girls and boys.   
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 The standard errors have been adjusted to allow for the inclusion of the predicted variables. It should 
also be noted that the estimated coefficients of the predicted allowance and hours variables might be 
inconsistent, see Wooldridge (2002). However, we are primarily concerned with only the sign and the 
significance of the effect in order to ascertain the robustness of our previous results. 
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It is evident for both boys and girls that the amount of the allowance received 
is positively associated with the probability that the child does not save, with the 
magnitude of the marginal effect being slightly larger for girls. This is the case when 
the allowance is exogenous (see Table 3A) and also when the allowance is treated as 
endogenous (see Table 3B). Interestingly, the influence of the number of hours 
worked per week for boys is statistically insignificant when hours of work are treated 
as exogenous (Table 3A), whereas the influence of hours of work becomes 
statistically significant once this variable is treated as endogenous (Table 3B). Such 
findings highlight the importance of allowing for the potential interdependence 
between the parental allowance received by boys and the number of hours they work. 
For girls, the number of hours worked has an inverse relationship with the probability 
of not saving in both Table 3A and Table 3B.  
In accordance with the results presented in Table 2, the total amount saved by 
the parent does not influence the probability of the child not saving for both boys and 
girls. However, controlling for whether the parent states that they save for no specific 
reason does decrease the probability that boys do not save. If the father saves for no 
specific reason then the son is 3.6 percentage points less likely not to save, whilst 
there is no significant effect from whether the mother saves for no specific reason. A 
noticeable difference between the saving behaviour of boys and girls concerns the 
influence of parent’s financial expectations. For girls, regardless of whether it is the 
financial optimism of the father or the mother, having a financially optimistic parent 
increases the probability that the child does not save by around 3.6 percentage points, 
whilst no such effect is evident for boys.  
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Dynamic Panel Probit Framework 
We now explore the robustness of our empirical findings once the potential state 
dependence of the child’s saving behaviour is allowed for. The results of estimating 
equation (2) are summarised in Table 4 (exogenous allowance and hours of work) and 
Table 5 (endogenous allowance and hours of work). Panel A of Tables 4 and 5 
presents the results based upon all children, and Panels B and C present the results of 
estimating equation (2) for boys and girls, respectively. Given the statistical 
significance of the random effects terms throughout the different models, unobserved 
heterogeneity is once again clearly of importance in explaining unsystematic 
variation. 
Following Stewart (2007), we focus our discussion on the estimated 
coefficients. Throughout the specifications, there is evidence of state dependence 
since whether the child did not save in the previous period is positively correlated 
with the child’s current saving behaviour – regardless of gender. Despite the presence 
of state dependence, the allowance received by the child is still of importance in 
influencing saving behaviour and this is apparent for both boys and girls. Noticeably, 
the effect of the allowance is much stronger in terms of magnitude for girls’ saving 
behaviour once the allowance is endogenised. There is also a noticeable effect for the 
financial expectations of the parents, which continue to have a statistically significant 
influence once state dependence is allowed for. For example, the effect of whether the 
father of the child is financially optimistic on the child’s saving behaviour is around a 
tenth of the magnitude of the effect of the lagged dependent variable. However, 
decomposing the analysis by gender reveals that this effect increases to approximately 
a third of the size of the influence of the lagged dependent variable when considering 
boys only. Furthermore, once state dependence is allowed for, the father-son and the 
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mother-son associations between financial optimism and the child’s saving behaviour 
are greater in magnitude than those for the father-daughter and the mother-daughter 
pairings. Hence, there is some evidence of an ‘own’ gender effect for males in the role 
of the financial expectations of the parent in influencing the saving decisions of their 
offspring. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the growing empirical literature exploring household 
finances and, specifically, contributes to our understanding of a relatively neglected 
area of the economics literature relating to the saving behaviour of children. To be 
specific, we explore the determinants of children’s saving behaviour using British 
panel data focusing on the role of parents via giving allowances to their children, their 
own saving behaviour and communicating their own financial outlook. We find 
relatively robust evidence suggesting that the allowance or pocket money that the 
child receives from their parents influences their saving behaviour and, in particular, 
that the amount of the allowance is positively associated with the probability of not 
saving. In contrast, hours of paid work undertaken by the child are positively 
associated with the probability that the child saves. Hence, it is apparent that different 
sources of income received by children appear to influence their saving behaviour in 
contrasting ways. This finding is robust to allowing for the potential interdependence 
between allowances received by children and hours of work supplied by children. 
Our findings also suggest that the actual saving behaviour of parents does not 
influence the saving decisions of their offspring, although the financial outlook of the 
parents does affect the saving behaviour of children. In addition, our findings 
highlight some interesting differences in the determinants of the saving behaviour of 
boys and girls, such as the influence of parent’s financial expectations, suggesting that 
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the differences in household finances, such as the propensity to hold risky financial 
assets, across adult males and females reported in the existing literature, may relate 
back to differences in attitudes towards finances during childhood. Finally, although 
the sample used for the analysis is based upon a group of children aged 11-15, there is 
evidence that their past attitudes towards saving influence their current behaviour, i.e. 
state dependence.  
Our empirical findings, thus, reveal some interesting insights relating to the 
saving behaviour of children and indicate that such behaviour is influenced by a 
variety of factors, some of which can be shaped by parents via, for example, the 
provision of allowances/pocket money or encouraging children to carry out some paid 
work. In addition, it is apparent that the extent to which parents share their 
expectations regarding household finances with their children may also influence the 
saving behaviour of their offspring. The diffusion of information regarding finances 
amongst household members thus appears to play an important role in the saving 
behaviour of children, especially for girls. Furthermore, the evidence of state 
dependence in children’s saving behaviour indicates that their future saving may also 
be influenced. Parents may thus be able to instil certain attitudes towards finances in 
their children, which consequently may be taken by children into adulthood. With 
increasing levels of debt and relatively low levels of saving at the household level, it 
is apparent that exploring the extent to which the saving behaviour and the financial 
management skills of children can be influenced provides potentially important 
information from a policy-making perspective. We hope, therefore, that our empirical 
findings will serve to stimulate further research into this important aspect of 
household finances and intergenerational analysis, which remains relatively 
unexplored in the economics literature. 
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TABLE 1: Summary Statistics 
 ALL CHILDREN BOYS GIRLS 
 MEAN STD MEAN STD MEAN STD 
Child does not save # 0.214 0.410 0.205 0.404 0.223 0.416 
Log child allowance 1.687 1.094 1.628 1.094 1.747 1.091 
Hours worked by child per week 1.053 2.306 1.123 2.351 0.983 2.257 
Log savings: both parents 2.294 2.660 2.370 2.700 2.217 2.618 
Log savings: father 1.796 2.323 1.890 2.372 1.699 2.269 
Log savings: mother 1.991 2.343 2.050 2.374 1.932 2.312 
Save for no specific reason: both parents # 0.171 0.377 0.181 0.385 0.162 0.368 
Save for no specific reason: father # 0.173 0.378 0.182 0.386 0.163 0.369 
Save for no specific reason: mother # 0.188 0.391 0.195 0.396 0.181 0.385 
Expect finances to improve: both parents # 0.328 0.469 0.327 0.469 0.329 0.470 
Expect finances to improve: father # 0.334 0.471 0.336 0.472 0.332 0.471 
Expect finances to improve: mother # 0.384 0.486 0.381 0.486 0.387 0.487 
Expect no change in finances: both parents # 0.592 0.491 0.602 0.490 0.582 0.493 
Expect no change in finances: father # 0.602 0.489 0.617 0.486 0.587 0.493 
Expect no change in finances: mother # 0.711 0.453 0.711 0.453 0.712 0.453 
Male child# 0.504 0.500 – – 
Age of child 13.035 1.423 13.038 1.419 13.031 1.427 
Age of child squared 171.924 37.258 172.014 37.145 171.832 37.379 
Natural child # 0.919 0.274 0.912 0.283 0.925 0.263 
Number of children in household 1.483 0.595 1.470 0.584 1.496 0.607 
Child has computer # 0.281 0.450 0.252 0.434 0.311 0.463 
Child intends to go to college # 0.723 0.447 0.677 0.468 0.770 0.421 
Child in single parent family # 0.213 0.409 0.210 0.407 0.215 0.411 
Number of adults in household 4.352 1.270 4.340 1.218 4.364 1.321 
Home owned outright # 0.089 0.285 0.092 0.290 0.085 0.279 
Home owned on mortgage # 0.598 0.490 0.606 0.489 0.589 0.492 
Home rented # 0.203 0.403 0.198 0.398 0.209 0.407 
Log labour income 7.729 0.692 7.745 0.693 7.112 0.690 
Log non labour income 6.410 1.173 6.379 1.166 6.442 1.179 
OBSERVATIONS 6,201 3,128 3,073 
#
 denotes a binary variable. 
TABLE 2: Probability that child does not save; random effects probit model 
 BOTH PARENTS FATHER MOTHER 
PANEL A: Exogenous allowance, hours COEF TSTAT M.E. COEF TSTAT M.E. COEF TSTAT M.E. 
Log child allowance 0.1137 (4.27) 0.0215 0.1135 (4.26) 0.0214 0.1132 (4.25) 0.0214 
Hours worked by child per week -0.0355 (2.88) -0.0067 -0.0354 (2.87) -0.0067 -0.0351 (2.85) -0.0066 
Log savings 0.0010 (0.01) 0.0001 -0.0030 (0.18) -0.0006 -0.0015 (0.10) -0.0003 
Save for no specific reason -0.1535 (1.93) -0.0289 -0.1412 (1.58) -0.0267 -0.1051 (1.25) -0.0199 
Expect finances to improve 0.1232 (1.92) 0.0233 0.1255 (1.99) 0.0237 0.1096 (1.66) 0.0207 
Expect no change in finances 0.1681 (2.10) 0.0317 0.1702 (2.21) 0.0321 0.1441 (2.07) 0.0271 
Male child -0.1130 (1.67) -0.0213 -0.1152 (1.70) -0.0218 -0.1104 (1.63) -0.0208 
Age of child -1.0087 (2.77) -0.1905 -1.0106 (2.78) -0.1908 -1.0062 (2.76) -0.1899 
Age of child squared 0.0411 (2.96) 0.0078 0.0412 (2.96) 0.0078 0.0410 (2.95) 0.0077 
Natural child -0.2597 (2.56) -0.0491 -0.2574 (2.53) -0.0486 -0.2594 (2.55) -0.0489 
Number of children in household 0.0228 (0.43) 0.0043 0.0233 (0.44) 0.0044 0.0220 (0.42) 0.0041 
Child has computer 0.2856 (4.11) 0.0539 0.2853 (4.11) 0.0539 0.2854 (4.11) 0.0539 
Child intends to go to college -0.3247 (5.19) -0.0613 -0.3245 (5.19) -0.0613 -0.3239 (5.18) -0.0612 
Child in single parent family 0.3749 (3.00) 0.0708 0.3629 (2.98) 0.0685 0.2591 (2.58) 0.0489 
Number of adults in household 0.0081 (0.25) 0.0015 0.0074 (0.23) 0.0014 0.0080 (0.24) 0.0015 
Home owned outright -0.2621 (1.80) -0.0495 -0.2624 (1.80) -0.0495 -0.2591 (1.77) -0.0489 
Home owned on mortgage -0.0105 (0.10) -0.0020 -0.0091 (0.09) -0.0017 -0.0114 (0.11) -0.0022 
Home rented 0.1554 (1.37) 0.0294 0.1553 (1.37) 0.0293 0.1593 (1.41) 0.0301 
Log labour income -0.0221 (0.40) -0.0042 -0.0205 (0.37) -0.0039 -0.0215 (0.39) -0.0041 
Log non labour income 0.0049 (0.18) 0.0009 0.0056 (0.20) 0.0010 0.0034 (0.12) 0.0006 
Wald chi squared (41), p value 174.94,  p=[0.000] 175.11,  p=[0.000] 173.70,  p=[0.000] 
ρ,  p value 0.5803,  p=[0.000] 0.5805,  p=[0.000] 0.5807,  p=[0.000] 
 BOTH PARENTS FATHER MOTHER 
PANEL B: Endogenous allowance, hours COEF TSTAT M.E. COEF TSTAT M.E. COEF TSTAT M.E. 
Log child allowance 0.3336 (2.57) 0.0631 0.3364 (2.59) 0.0636 0.3264 (2.51) 0.0617 
Hours worked by child per week -0.0065 (4.39) -0.0012 -0.0065 (4.38) -0.0012 -0.0065 (4.37) -0.0012 
Log savings -0.0010 (0.01) -0.0001 -0.0031 (0.19) -0.0006 -0.0016 (0.11) -0.0003 
Save for no specific reason -0.1511 (1.70) -0.0286 -0.1388 (1.55) -0.0262 -0.1026 (1.22) -0.0194 
Expect finances to improve 0.1226 (1.91) 0.0232 0.1259 (1.90) 0.0238 0.1075 (1.63) 0.0203 
Expect no change in finances 0.1684 (2.11) 0.0319 0.1722 (2.24) 0.0326 0.1436 (2.07) 0.0271 
Wald chi squared (41), p value 175.49,  p=[0.000] 175.76,  p=[0.000] 174.17,  p=[0.000] 
ρ,  p value 0.5788,  p=[0.000] 0.5790,  p=[0.000] 0.5792,  p=[0.000] 
OBSERVATIONS 6,201 
Notes: (i) 5 year dummy variables and 16 regional controls are included. Control variables in Panel B are as given in Panel A; (ii) Standard errors are available for the marginal effects 
on request. 
 TABLE 3A: Probability that child does not save (split by gender), exogenous allowance and hours; random effects probit model 
 BOTH PARENTS FATHER MOTHER 
PANEL A: Boys COEF TSTAT M.E. COEF TSTAT M.E. COEF TSTAT M.E. 
Log child allowance 0.1122 (3.05) 0.0203 0.1119 (3.05) 0.0202 0.1114 (3.03) 0.0201 
Hours worked by child per week -0.0182 (1.08) -0.0033 -0.0180 (1.07) -0.0033 -0.0183 (1.08) -0.0033 
Log savings 0.0049 (0.26) 0.0009 0.0063 (0.28) 0.0011 0.0025 (0.12) 0.0005 
Save for no specific reason -0.2023 (1.82) -0.0365 -0.2001 (1.80) -0.0361 -0.1194 (1.01) -0.0216 
Expect finances to improve 0.0965 (0.96) 0.0174 0.0982 (1.01) 0.0177 0.0598 (0.65) 0.0108 
Expect no change in finances 0.1769 (1.55) 0.0319 0.1520 (1.41) 0.0274 0.1156 (1.19) 0.0209 
CONTROLS As in Table 2 
Wald chi squared (40), p value 117.13,  p=[0.000] 116.79,  p=[0.000] 115.76,  p=[0.000] 
ρ,  p value 0.5603,  p=[0.000] 0.5606,  p=[0.000] 0.5597,  p=[0.000] 
OBSERVATIONS 3,128 
 BOTH PARENTS FATHER MOTHER 
PANEL B: Girls COEF TSTAT M.E. COEF TSTAT M.E. COEF TSTAT M.E. 
Log child allowance 0.1227 (3.14) 0.0242 0.1228 (3.14) 0.0242 0.1214 (3.10) 0.0239 
Hours worked by child per week -0.0566 (3.09) -0.0111 -0.0566 (3.09) -0.0112 -0.0559 (3.05) -0.0110 
Log savings -0.0046 (0.24) -0.0009 -0.0103 (0.44) -0.0020 -0.0057 (0.26) -0.0011 
Save for no specific reason -0.1338 (1.05) -0.0264 -0.1146 (0.89) -0.0226 -0.1177 (0.98) -0.0231 
Expect finances to improve 0.1801 (1.95) 0.0355 0.1783 (1.96) 0.0351 0.1845 (1.93) 0.0363 
Expect no change in finances 0.1378 (1.21) 0.0272 0.1643 (1.48) 0.0324 0.1558 (1.55) 0.0306 
CONTROLS As in Table 2 
Wald chi squared (40), p value 101.72,  p=[0.000] 101.88,  p=[0.000] 101.83,  p=[0.000] 
ρ,  p value 0.5878,  p=[0.000] 0.5885,  p=[0.000] 0.5897,  p=[0.000] 
OBSERVATIONS 3,073 
Notes: (i) 5 year dummy variables and 16 regional controls are included. Control variables in Panel B are as given in Panel A; (ii) Standard errors are available for the marginal effects 
on request. 
 
 
 TABLE 3B: Probability that child does not save (split by gender), endogenous allowance and hours; random effects probit model 
 BOTH PARENTS FATHER MOTHER 
PANEL A: Boys COEF TSTAT M.E. COEF TSTAT M.E. COEF TSTAT M.E. 
Log child allowance 0.2439 (2.15) 0.0440 0.2401 (2.12) 0.0433 0.2456 (1.91) 0.0444 
Hours worked by child per week -0.0094 (3.06) -0.0017 -0.0094 (3.04) -0.0017 -0.0094 (3.05) -0.0017 
Log savings 0.0052 (0.28) 0.0009 0.0065 (0.29) 0.0012 0.0029 (0.13) 0.0005 
Save for no specific reason -0.2002 (1.81) -0.0361 -0.1977 (1.80) -0.0356 -0.1175 (1.01) -0.0212 
Expect finances to improve 0.1016 (1.01) 0.0183 0.0999 (1.02) 0.0180 0.0677 (0.73) 0.0122 
Expect no change in finances 0.1793 (1.58) 0.0324 0.1495 (1.38) 0.0269 0.1224 (1.25) 0.0221 
CONTROLS As in Table 2 
Wald chi squared (40), p value 118.69,  p=[0.000] 118.23,  p=[0.000] 118.12,  p=[0.000] 
ρ,  p value 0.5602,  p=[0.000] 0.5607,  p=[0.000] 0.5580,  p=[0.000] 
OBSERVATIONS 3,128 
 BOTH PARENTS FATHER MOTHER 
PANEL B: Girls COEF TSTAT M.E. COEF TSTAT M.E. COEF TSTAT M.E. 
Log child allowance 0.3462 (1.99) 0.0686 0.3471 (1.94) 0.0687 0.3354 (1.97) 0.0662 
Hours worked by child per week -0.0078 (3.38) -0.0015 -0.0078 (3.38) -0.0015 -0.0077 (3.35) -0.0015 
Log savings -0.0050 (0.28) -0.0010 -0.0110 (0.48) -0.0022 -0.0060 (0.28) -0.0012 
Save for no specific reason -0.1298 (1.02) -0.0257 -0.1096 (0.86) -0.0218 -0.1152 (0.97) -0.0227 
Expect finances to improve 0.1752 (1.90) 0.0347 0.1733 (1.92) 0.0343 0.1781 (1.97) 0.0352 
Expect no change in finances 0.1352 (1.19) 0.0268 0.1619 (1.46) 0.0320 0.1569 (1.56) 0.0310 
CONTROLS As in Table 2 
Wald chi squared (40), p value 99.13,  p=[0.000] 99.30,  p=[0.000] 99.21,  p=[0.000] 
ρ,  p value 0.5849,  p=[0.000] 0.5860,  p=[0.000] 0.5869,  p=[0.000] 
OBSERVATIONS 3,073 
Notes: (i) 5 year dummy variables and 16 regional controls are included. Control variables in Panel B are as given in Panel A; (ii) Standard errors are available for the marginal effects 
on request. 
 TABLE 4: Probability that child does not save, exogenous allowance and hours; dynamic panel probit model 
PANEL A: All Children BOTH PARENTS FATHER MOTHER COEF TSTAT  COEF TSTAT  COEF TSTAT  
Child does not savet-1 1.2843 (5.12)  1.2706 (5.03)  1.7358 (4.77)  
Log child allowance 0.1222 (2.92)  0.1231 (2.94)  0.1225 (2.90)  
Hours worked by child per week -0.0245 (1.25)  -0.0248 (1.27)  -0.0244 (1.24)  
Log savings -0.0201 (0.99)  -0.0353 (1.41)  -0.0337 (1.43)  
Save for no specific reason -0.0373 (0.27)  0.0287 (0.21)  0.0294 (0.22)  
Expect finances to improve 0.1152 (2.23)  0.1729 (2.82)  0.2113 (2.11)  
Expect no change in finances 0.0596 (0.62)  0.1399 (1.44)  0.1785 (1.64)  
Wald chi squared (10), p value 57.06,  p=[0.000] 61.12,  p=[0.000] 59.17,  p=[0.000] 
λ,  p value 0.2003,  p=[0.000] 0.2017,  p=[0.000] 0.2199,  p=[0.000] 
OBSERVATIONS 5,103 
PANEL B: Boys BOTH PARENTS FATHER MOTHER COEF TSTAT  COEF TSTAT  COEF TSTAT  
Child does not savet-1 1.0228 (2.73)  0.9832 (2.54)  1.0465 (2.77)  
Log child allowance 0.1019 (1.92)  0.1006 (1.90)  0.0945 (1.81)  
Hours worked by child per week -0.0083 (0.36)  -0.0076 (0.33)  -0.0107 (0.46)  
Log savings 0.0220 (0.82)  0.0146 (0.45)  0.0165 (0.54)  
Save for no specific reason -0.3329 (1.72)  -0.3006 (1.56)  -0.1367 (0.79)  
Expect finances to improve 0.2672 (2.12)  0.2882 (2.29)  0.2455 (1.99)  
Expect no change in finances 0.1104 (0.85)  0.0986 (0.75)  0.1065 (0.75)  
Wald chi squared (10), p value 22.13,  p=[0.009] 19.44,  p=[0.022] 21.35,  p=[0.011] 
λ,  p value 0.1069,  p=[0.000] 0.0859,  p=[0.000] 0.1056,  p=[0.000] 
OBSERVATIONS 2,580 
PANEL C: Girls BOTH PARENTS FATHER MOTHER COEF TSTAT  COEF TSTAT  COEF TSTAT  
Child does not savet-1 0.6718 (3.15)  0.6610 (3.14)  0.6661 (3.16)  
Log child allowance 0.0877 (1.90)  0.0888 (1.92)  0.0882 (1.92)  
Hours worked by child per week -0.0254 (1.17)  -0.0069 (1.17)  -0.0237 (1.09)  
Log savings -0.0098 (0.44)  -0.0148 (0.54)  -0.0144 (0.56)  
Save for no specific reason -0.2257 (1.43)  -0.2155 (1.36)  0.1734 (1.17)  
Expect finances to improve 0.0708 (2.68)  0.0848 (1.81)  0.1162 (2.05)  
Expect no change in finances 0.0247 (0.23)  0.0368 (0.35)  0.1429 (1.20)  
Wald chi squared (10), p value 22.73,  p=[0.007] 22.85,  p=[0.007] 23.08,  p=[0.000] 
λ,  p value 0.3088,  p=[0.057] 0.3616,  p=[0.045] 0.3142,  p=[0.000] 
OBSERVATIONS 2,523 
Note: Additional controls throughout each specification are time varying covariates. 
 TABLE 5: Probability that child does not save, endogenous allowance and hours; dynamic panel probit model 
PANEL A: All Children BOTH PARENTS FATHER MOTHER COEF TSTAT  COEF TSTAT  COEF TSTAT  
Child does not savet-1 1.3358 (5.58)  1.3231 (5.49)  1.2876 (5.23)  
Log child allowance 0.1983 (1.79)  0.2048 (1.85)  0.1942 (1.74)  
Hours worked by child per week -0.0060 (2.79)  -0.0060 (2.79)  -0.0060 (2.78)  
Log savings -0.0201 (1.01)  -0.0352 (1.43)  -0.0338 (1.46)  
Save for no specific reason -0.0298 (0.22)  0.0363 (0.27)  0.0369 (0.29)  
Expect finances to improve 0.1124 (2.22)  0.1693 (1.92)  0.2039 (2.07)  
Expect no change in finances 0.0587 (0.63)  0.1389 (1.46)  0.1729 (1.62)  
Wald chi squared (10), p value 64.33,  p=[0.000] 68.56,  p=[0.000] 66.57,  p=[0.000] 
λ,  p value 0.1710,  p=[0.000] 0.1717,  p=[0.000] 0.1880,  p=[0.000] 
OBSERVATIONS 5,103 
PANEL B: Boys BOTH PARENTS FATHER MOTHER COEF TSTAT  COEF TSTAT  COEF TSTAT  
Child does not savet-1 0.9678 (2.52)  0.9443 (2.42)  0.9838 (2.51)  
Log child allowance 0.0745 (0.60)  0.0691 (0.56)  0.0835 (0.68)  
Hours worked by child per week -0.0073 (1.67)  -0.0071 (1.64)  -0.0068 (1.58)  
Log savings 0.0223 (0.83)  0.0156 (0.48)  0.0167 (0.54)  
Save for no specific reason -0.3367 (1.72)  -0.3053 (1.57)  -0.1409 (0.80)  
Expect finances to improve 0.2650 (2.08)  0.2816 (2.22)  0.2453 (1.92)  
Expect no change in finances 0.1081 (0.82)  0.0904 (0.68)  0.1137 (0.80)  
Wald chi squared (10), p value 19.90,  p=[0.019] 19.78,  p=[0.019] 17.18,  p=[0.046] 
λ,  p value 0.1221,  p=[0.000] 0.1187,  p=[0.000] 0.1014,  p=[0.000] 
OBSERVATIONS 2,580 
PANEL C: Girls BOTH PARENTS FATHER MOTHER COEF TSTAT  COEF TSTAT  COEF TSTAT  
Child does not savet-1 0.6971 (3.27)  0.6860 (3.26)  0.6891 (3.25)  
Log child allowance 0.3255 (2.78)  0.3271 (2.79)  0.3172 (2.72)  
Hours worked by child per week -0.0029 (1.11)  -0.0029 (1.13)  -0.0029 (1.11)  
Log savings -0.0081 (0.37)  -0.0137 (0.51)  -0.0129 (0.51)  
Save for no specific reason -0.2226 (1.43)  -0.2087 (1.34)  -0.1649 (1.13)  
Expect finances to improve 0.0802 (1.79)  0.0938 (1.91)  0.1138 (2.05)  
Expect no change in finances 0.0359 (0.35)  0.0487 (0.47)  0.1419 (1.20)  
Wald chi squared (10), p value 30.72,  p=[0.000] 30.63,  p=[0.003] 30.61,  p=[0.000] 
λ,  p value 0.2788,  p=[0.097] 0.2864,  p=[0.079] 0.2861,  p=[0.086] 
OBSERVATIONS 2,523 
Note: Additional controls throughout each specification are time varying covariates. 
 
